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Introduction  
Few would challenge that terrorism, warlordism and organized crime—also known as the Deadly 
Trinity—could exhibit many similar characteristics but would they in any way be associated or 
even linked in a global proliferation network of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)? The case of 
the London Ricin Cell gave rise to cause for concern that it was such a WMD proliferation 
network. This chapter will address this topic using specific questions: 1) how many people would 
constituent a cell or a network; 2) if such a network existed then what type of substance would 
constituent the capability to inflict mass destruction; 3) is it necessary for ideological or religious 
elements to be present in a WMD proliferation network; 4) at which point would terrorism, 
warlordism or organized crime implement a WMD proliferation network with or without ideological 
or religious elements and 5) does existing legislation permit prosecution based on evidence of 
latent intent and capability but without the presence of an actual biological or chemical weapon. 
This is a salient topic given that there currently 60 people awaiting trial in the UK for terrorist-
related offences; three further terrorist attacks since 7 July 2005 have been disrupted; and over 
1,200 people have been identified as being activists the security service believe are engaged in 
acts of terrorism at home and abroad.[1] The structure of the chapter is to relate the event of the 
Ricin Cell as a narrative as well as evaluate how the event unfolded as a discourse within the 
context of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003). This is be undertaken under the headings: The 
Event of The London Ricin Cell; The Deadly Trinity (warlordism, organized crime and terrorism); 
The Grey Area Phenomena; Escalation of the Deadly Trinity and The London Ricin Cell; and The 
Limitations of Domestic Law. 
The Event of the London Ricin Cell 
On Sunday morning 5 January 2003 at the height of diplomatic efforts that led to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, which commenced on 19 March 2003, combined forces of the Anti-Terrorist Branch 
police, Scotland Yard Special Branch police and the Security Service (MI5) raided a north London 
apartment in the suburb of Wood Green. This was in part following evidence obtained during a 
previous evenings unrelated arrest after the murder of a police officer in Manchester. This was 
also in part from intelligence reports and from the interrogation of Mohammed Meguerba, a 
captured militant in Algiers. The combined information and analysis and the political atmosphere 
at the time of the Iraq crises led local authorities to believe that extremist violent groups were 
planning and were intending to launch a chemical, biological or radiological attack in the United 
Kingdom. This was in part substantiated with the arrest of seven men of North African origin 
including two teenage asylum seekers, all reasonably well-off financially and three with some 
tertiary education. Investigators at Scotland Yard indicated that one of these seven men had 
attended an al-Qa`ida training camp in Afghanistan, whereas others had received terrorist training 
in Chechnya and the Pankisi Gorge region of the Newly Independent State of Georgia.[2] 
The gathering of forensics and evidence at the Wood Green scene gave sufficient cause to warn 
all doctors (GP’s) nationwide through the National Health System (NHS) system to look out for 
signs of exposure to the potentially lethal poison ricin. Castor oil beans—from which ricin is 
made—and equipment and containers for crushing the beans had been found in the apartment 
together with a formula for making ricin. Scientists at the Defence Science and Technology 
Laboratories at Porton Down in Wiltshire identified the nature of the substance while police did 
not rule out the possibility that some ricin may already have been distributed for the purposes of 
attacks.[3] Ricin is considered a potential biowarfare or bioterrorist agent and is on the Centre for 
Disease Control and Prevention's “B” list of agents—considered a moderate threat. 
At the time, it was thought that the arrestees did not have the capability to make a mass 
destructive weapon, but they could have aimed to create mass panic by trying to kill small 
numbers of people. Ricin is relatively easy to manufacture in small amounts but would be 
considered an unusual agent to use for a mass attack as it must be ingested, injected or inhaled 
at close proximity to take effect. Defence minister Geoff Hoon described the discovery of the ricin 
formula and raw materials as a “disturbing development.” Prime Minister Tony Blair addressed 
the nation and said the arrests showed the continued threat of international terrorism was 
“present and real and with us now and its potential is huge.”[4] 
Within days of the Wood Green raid and arrests, authorities spoke of concerns about possible 
ricin terrorist attacks, even though ricin had not been found in a weaponised form at the Wood 
Green site. Public speculation followed fueled by media reports, both there and in the United 
States, about links between the arrested men and Abu Musab Zarqawi, whom U.S. intelligence 
had tried to identify as linked to al Qaeda, linked to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and linked to 
a camp in northern Iraq where ricin had also been found. Vice President Cheney, speaking of 
Hussein and his terrorist allies in the same voice, told a Chamber of Commerce audience “The 
gravity of the threat we face was underscored in recent days when British police arrested . . . 
suspected terrorists in London and discovered a small quantity of ricin, one of the world's 
deadliest poisons.” A week later at the White House, then-press secretary Ari Fleischer told 
reporters, “When you read about people in London being arrested for possession of ricin, there 
clearly remain people in the world who want to inflict as much harm as they can on the Western 
world and on others.” On 3 February 2003 Tony Blair told the House of Commons that the “ricin 
terror plot” was “powerful evidence of the continuing terrorist threat.” In his 5 February speech to 
the U.N. Security Council, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell put up a slide that linked a “U.K. 
poison cell” to Zarqawi and stated “According to a detainee named Abuwatia, Musab al-Zarqawi, 
the Islamist linked to al-Qaida and recently self-proclaimed perpetrator of atrocities in Iraq, 
ordered North African extremists to travel to Europe to conduct poison and explosive attacks. The 
detainee who helped piece this together says the plot also targeted Britain.”[5] After U.S. troops 
seized the northern Iraq camp linked to Zarqawi, General Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, told CNN's “Late Edition” on 30 March “We think that's probably where the ricin 
that was found in London came [from]... At least the operatives and maybe some of the formulas 
came from this site.”[6] 
The arrests, the media coverage, the importance attached to this event by politicians and 
generals, and the context in the lead-in to a war in the Gulf, created the historical moment 
indicating a significant turning point for contemplating how to tackle WMD proliferation networks. 
The mere inference of the existence of such networks being a cause for concern given their 
ability to invoke and inflect mass fear, terror and destruction. The arrestees of the London Ricin 
Cell clearly being guilty at least of incitement and conspiracy to cause mass fear and terror 
through maybe the murder of a few high level individuals. The positive note being that the London 
Ricin Cell had been thwarted prior to any physical injuries or deaths. The next step was to 
apprehend the rest of the network. As is the case in any subsequent operation of such a type the 
first next stage is intelligence in ascertaining the extent, the nature and characteristics of such a 
network. Having noted the narrative of the events and discourse within the context of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (2003) this chapter will continue to consider the notion of The Deadly Trinity as a 
marriage of convenience of warlordism, organized crime and terrorism and then turn back to the 
actual events of the London Ricin Cell within the judicial context. 
The Deadly Trinity: Warlordism, Organized Crime and Terrorism 
Recently in the mid-to-late 1990s, even prior to 9/11 and the Axis of Evil pronouncement speech, 
a group of researchers worked on considering the linkages of the Deadly Trinity—warlordism, 
organized crime and terrorism—through the characteristics, definitions, activities and types of 
people and communities involved in all three activities.[7] The linkages between organized crime, 
corruption, weapons trafficking and terrorism having already attracted the interests of academic, 
government and NGO writings.[8] The theoretical underpinnings related to structural and 
relational changes in the international system brought about by globalization. During the 1990s 
there was no concern that any such linkages were in any fashion tending towards a WMD 
proliferation network. Initial hypothetical thoughts tended towards a research agenda to show that 
drug trafficking and other organised crime such as human trafficking, money laundering, and 
weapons trade were all linked with warlordism.[9] Initial research progressed quickly and 
sustained such a notion linking two sides of the Dead Trinity—warlordism and organised crime. 
This research demonstrated that warlordism was an established phenomena associated with the 
structure and culture of certain societies. Some clans, tribes or nations, such as in Europe, had 
adopted political ideologies including nationalism and had established sovereign territorial nation 
states. Elsewhere in the world other clans, tribes or nations preferred warlord-type communal 
governance. Such warlords lived in cohesive and frequently closed communities sometimes 
within sovereign nation-states and tended not to be involved in international affairs such as 
diplomacy or international regimes such as the United Nations. In many instances family ties in a 
clan-style was a prevalent factor of the cohesiveness of the warlords’ control. The warlord-style 
governance did not appear to have manifestations of radical or militant theological or ideological 
elements even though religion was significant in daily practises. 
In some parts of the world warlords and the central governments of sovereign states co-existed 
where government officials were content to permit warlordism so long as their own titular power 
and status remained.[10] Such a phenomena of warlords was frequently prevalent in states that 
were not democracies. Often the security forces of such states were unable to control the 
warlords activities and did not even attempt to do so. This is led to understanding that in some 
cases warlordism could arise and gather momentum in weak (also known as fragile) or failed 
states while in other cases weak and failed states arose due to the presence and activities of 
warlords. These understandings about warlordism were substantiated in the cases of Afghanistan, 
Columbia, Kosovo, and Somalia. 
Given the nature of the changing security environment from state based threats of the Cold War 
to post-Cold War societal issues the research then turned to consider the nature of organised 
criminal networks and cartels for example human trafficking and narcotic trafficking. Similar to the 
case of warlordism it was demonstrated that serious organised crime arose and flourished in 
states that were not democracies and where the security forces of such states were unable to 
control the criminal activities and did not even attempt to do so. This is led to understanding that 
in some cases organised crime could arise and gather momentum in weak or failed states while 
in other cases weak and failed states arose due to the presence and activities of organised crime. 
These understandings about organised crime were substantiated in the case of Afghanistan and 
Columbia, both noted as source of drug production and international drug trafficking. 
Such findings gave cause to consider if any specific linkages could exist between warlordism and 
organised crime, as a marriage of convenience, given that both had been shown to exist in weak 
and failed states for example Afghanistan and Columbia. In doing so and along a time-line of 
centuries w arlordism could be identified as having been present prior to international drug 
trafficking. The criminal activity of drug production and trafficking has not necessarily been driven 
by the existence of warlords nor did warlords necessarily instigate it. In instances where 
warlordism and organised crime have coalesced, narcotic and human trafficking and its 
associated criminal activities have been catalysts generating the means for warlords to escalate 
and wage protracted conflict. In the marriage of convenience organised crime has recruited 
narcotic traffickers from the clan/tribal warlordism. The use of violence and fear has been a tactic 
to ensure that those recruited for such a role adhered to instructions while the cohesive clan 
structure provided secrecy. 
In such a coalescence of warlordism and organised crime, domestic law enforcement has been 
progressively curtailed. For example, despite the executions world-wide of thousands of people 
convicted of drug related offences, most after unfair trials, the use of the death penalty has not 
suppressed drug trafficking and organised crime. Further, whereas much of the separate criminal 
activity and warlordism was confined to a specific geographic area, for example during the Cold 
War, the coalescence of organised crime and warlordism in the era of globalisation has resulted 
in a growing internationalization to secure weapons, and to launder large sums of money.[11] It is 
not surprising that warlordism and narco-terrorism have become a part of the underworld 
dictionary of threats to world order. As the United Nations International Narcotics Control Board 
noted failure to bring traffickers under control can lead to internal chaos, and even civil war. The 
report states “Illegal drug production and trafficking financed by organized crime is so pervasive 
that the economies of entire countries are disrupted, legal institutions menaced and the very 
security of some states threatened.”[12] 
There have been increased activities of networks of criminal activities across state boundaries 
that have merged heretofore-separate offences in different states in pursuit of common goals 
eroding local and national governmental power both economically and militarily, even in 
democratic states. In an escalatory and reciprocal fashion this has generated a global and 
criminal dimension to the funding of ethnic and sub-state conflicts on a global basis.[13] This has 
been to the extent that central state authority has been eroded both economically and militarily 
leading to a growing number of weak and failed states. In these weak and failed states there has 
been notable corruption amongst state officials engaged in drug trafficking while the main 
revenue for a large section of the population has been the narcotic trade. As such criminal 
activities transcend territorial borders with the onset of the 21st Century there has evidently been 
a necessity for stronger states to intervene across sovereign borders at the source of warlordism 
and organised crime in weak and failed states. 
Such action is not always applicable to counter the Deadly Trinity. It is well known that terrorist 
organisations use normally legitimate organisations such as charities to raise funds. Further, by 
2006 the links between terrorism and organised crime have also entered cyberspace. Money is 
terrorisms lifeline where numerous terrorist groups request funds directly from Web surfers who 
visit their sites. Some are less discrete than others and offer bank account details, PAYPAL or 
credit card facilities for direct payments. Others are more discrete through the establishment of 
online stores and in the sale of items such as books, audio and video tapes, flags, t-shirts etc. 
Additionally and according to Jean-Francois Ricard, one of France’s top anti-terrorism 
investigators many Islamist terror plots are financed through credit card fraud.[14] Determining 
what is a legitimate business by a legitimate entrepreneur and what is an illegitimate business by 
a terrorist is a daunting task. 
The Grey Area Phenomena  
After an increase in radical, militant and fundamentalist international terrorist activities in the late 
1990s and early 21st century, this research agenda into the Deadly Trinity turned to consider 
whether organised crime and terrorism and/or whether warlordism and terrorism were also in any 
fashion developing a marriage of convenience. It was understood the existence of weak and 
failed states could harbour terrorist groups and their training camps. Further and of significance it 
was debated hypothetically whether the grey area phenomena became apparent as an ethic and 
sub state military dimension, when warlords took on the role of drug trafficking across state 
boundaries. 
In general terms the grey area phenomena was identified as trans-national threats to the stability 
of nation-states by non-state actors and non-governmental processes and organizations. In 
specific terms the grey area phenomena was identified as low intensity conflicts ranging 
associated with a various combination of terrorism, insurgencies, and illegal local drug trafficking 
which in some cases was seen to result in an escalation to warlordism that challenged state 
existence, e.g., Columbia, militant fundamentalism, e.g., Afghanistan, and ethnic cleansing, e.g., 
Kosovo. It was debated, that this could eventually lead to a situation where the warlords could 
eventually become the dominant economic, political and military authority but short of being the 
government of the state.[15] At the time of this research in the 1990s in the immediate post-
Soviet era the thinking was that after the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons the grey area phenomena was the most 
serious and probable issue threatening the global community.[16] 
The United Nations General Assembly expressed alarm in numerous debates at the growing link 
between these phenomena given that warlords, organised crime and terrorism in a marriage of 
convenience could lead to global anarchy and chaos. Unrestrained by borders and international 
protocols, individuals and societies were threatened on global proportions. This was not only 
within weak and failed states through the erosion of government and state authority. It is also 
across sovereign state boundaries into well-established democratic free market states. The term 
drug terrorism was expressed noting instances where illicit drug trafficking by Asian and African 
drug warlords had contributed to disorder in some European and North American megacities 
eroding the rule of law and order and government services.[17] This culminated in a statement by 
President Clinton that “the inability of democratic nations to come to grips with the supply and 
demand aspects of illicit drugs, trans-national narco-trafficking is a threat to national security.”[18] 
Hence the United Nations General Assembly passed a Resolution requested its member states to 
pay particular attention to the links between illicit drug smuggling, warlordism and terrorism and to 
propose viable control measures. The ensuing Global Program of Action called for measures to 
be taken to prevent illicit and covert arms and explosives transfers, as well as other drug traffic 
related activities. 
Reconsidering this research in a world typified by suicide bombers against civilian targets in 
democratic states (e.g., 9/11, Madrid Train Bombs, London Transport Bombs etc) and the London 
Ricin Cell gives rise to debate and cause to investigate whether narco-trafficking, organized 
criminal network, warlordism and the emergence of street drug gangs in European and North 
America could be joined in planning and executing proliferation networks of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and in ideological or theological terrorism. Underlying the justification for 
concern is the well-established fact that al-Qaeda was born and grew in Afghanistan in the 
heyday of its opium manufacture and clan/tribal warlordism. 
Daily interactions between terrorist camps and warlords in weak and failed states could lead to 
the increasing radicalising or militarisation of local clans/tribes. Inherent is the concern that more 
warlords and organized crime networks will attain ideological and/or theological intonation, 
leading to the need to consider whether this is the radicalization of politics or the creation of 
extremist militarism and whether this of global proportions. This is also significant for considering 
whether more failed or weak states will emerge and how to handle such a situation. This could 
lead to the emergence of narco-trafficking and human trafficking routes, networks and individuals 
becoming a means for radical and militant terrorist organisations to expand their global activities 
in fear, violence, and terror and in WMD proliferation. Such a network that has originated in one 
country (weak/failed) may continue in another country (Western Democracy) through networks of 
organized crime, religious organizations, political movements, etc. All regions of the world could 
thus become victim to new forms of WMD proliferation. 
Such concerns have been expressed in writings on networked threats that dominate the security 
horizon.[19] Such writings elaborate on Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), extremist 
organizations, exemplified by the self-proclaimed global jihadi movement (al-Qaeda) and its 
affiliates. These are complex non-state actors operating as trans-national networks within a 
galaxy of like-minded networks. These trans-national entities exploit the seams of traditional 
approaches to security and intelligence and the traditional boundaries between national security 
and criminal enforcement. These networked global insurgents mix political and religious 
fanaticism with criminal enterprises to exploit the seams between crime and war. 
Escalation of the Deadly Trinity: The London Ricin Cell 
Such causes for concern were noted in judicial deliberations on the London Ricin Cell. The 
investigators, the prosecution and the judges in the trial provided clear evidence of growing 
patterns and trends of links between illicit organized crime, known terrorists, and weak or failed 
states that harbor warlordism and terrorists organizations. However, there was deep concern that 
the specific investigation did not reveal leads to additional networks. For example, during the trial 
of one of the accused, Kamel Bourgass, evidence emerged that he was implicated in a global 
network that combined warlordism, organized crime and trafficking in chemical technologies that 
could be weaponized. The evidence included the following facts.[20] 
• He arrived in the UK in February 1998 using an Italian identity card in the name of Fabio 
Marco and claimed residence and later sought political asylum.  
• He lived at the Finsbury Park Mosque for over a year in 1999/2000 and stated that he 
knew known terrorists Abu Doha, Toufiq and Houssam only because they prayed there, 
although he had previously denied that he knew Abu Doha.  
• He had used a false French passport in the name of Sylvian Delas to make several trips 
to the United Arab Emirates in May and June 2001.  
• He traveled to Georgia in July 2001 on the same false passport, from where he was 
deported back to the UK—he had attempted to travel to Chechnya but had been detained 
by Georgian police on 3 July 2001 as he attempted to enter the Pankisi Gorge.  
• In September 2001 UK Security Service surveillance noted that he and an associate 
subsequently identified as Mohamed Yacine Ankouche had used anti-surveillance 
techniques during a journey to St. Albans near London. It was assessed that the visit to a 
photo-booth was to obtain photographs to use in false documentation. Redacted copies 
of surveillance reports dated 28 September and 2 October 2001 were included among 
the documents produced with the Statement. These described his behaviour and his 
associate in some detail, e.g. “they appeared to wait until everyone else had cleared the 
platform before jumping back onto the train; when the train stopped at St. Albans they 
were seen to pause on the platform, looking at other passengers.”  
• When he was apprehended in October 2001 for violation of asylum seeking conditions he 
had a French driving licence in the name of Adam Naouli.  
• Following his escape from detention in February 2002 he re-involved himself in extremist 
activity. He provided support for the network of North African extreme Islamists, including 
former members of the Abu Doha group, planning terrorist attacks in the UK and Europe 
including the use of toxic chemicals. His activities suggested that he could be properly 
described as a member of the network.  
• He was rearrested in September 2002 where evidence came to light, in the words of the 
judge “You are a senior member of group of Mujahideen engaged in active support for 
various international terrorist groups, including networks associated with Usama Bin 
Laden. Your activities on behalf of Islamist networks include facilitation of travel for 
Mujahideen, in particular from Abu Doha’s group, to and from Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
the Caucasus. You have also attempted to join Ibn Khattab’s Arab Mujahideen in 
Chechnya in order to fight. You held a senior position within Abu Doha’s group and you 
have provided active support for a network of extreme Islamists planning to carry out 
attacks in the UK and Western Europe including the use of toxic poisons.”  
• When detained, he was in possession of mobile telephone numbers associated with 
Toufiq and Abdelrahman Ghafiqui, a former member of the GIA who latterly worked on 
behalf of its splinter organisation, the GSPC, and was involved in fundraising for the 
Chechen Mujahideen; he was also in contact with other significant members of the GIA 
and the GSPC; he had maintained close contact with a North African extreme Islamist 
network based in Pakistan and Afghanistan with links to Al Qa'ida which was heavily 
involved, prior to the Allied invasion of Afghanistan, in organizing the travel of extremists 
to and from Afghanistan and the training camps located there.  
• Following an appeal it was established in trial that he was in regular contact with known 
terrorists including Abu Doha himself, Abu Doha’s successor Toufiq, and other named 
members of the group including Houssam Mohammed Kouchi; many of those associated 
with the group had undergone terrorist training in Afghanistan and had been active in the 
provision of logistical support to Algerian terrorist groups including the GSPC, the Arab 
Mujahideen in Chechnya and terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.  
• His activities on behalf of this network included the provision of financial and logistical 
support.  
• When arrested in London on 20 September 2002 he was found to be in possession of a 
bankcard in the name of Izac Katti. He denied any knowledge of a Belgian passport 
found at his address, but admitted that he recognised the photograph as that of “Toufiq” 
whom he had seen at the Finsbury Park Mosque but had not seen for at least 18 months. 
He attributed false documentation found at his address to an individual called Djamel, 
who was assessed to be Aissa Khalef. Khalef was traced to an address in Norfolk where 
he was arrested on 26 September and found to be in possession of a document in Arabic 
on the production of poisons, explosives and electronic circuits.  
• In January 2003 the Metropolitan Police Anti Terrorist Branch searched a flat in Wood 
Green. What was found there pointed to the preparation of toxic chemicals for terrorist 
use. It was assessed that not all of the toxic chemicals manufactured in the UK had been 
recovered.  
This specific evidence from the London Ricin Cell on the eve of the Gulf War (2003) led to a 
cause for concern of an overall escalation in violence and terror and the existence of more WMD 
proliferation networks. Prudence dictated that considering how to tackle these phenomena turned 
to two options. These options rested at tackling the constituent components of the Deadly Trinity 
at the source in weak or failed states maybe through pre-emptive military strikes or at the point of 
potential attack maybe through community policing. Deciding which option was more viable could 
be determined by ascertaining at which point terrorism, warlordism or organized crime could and 
would implement a WMD proliferation network with or without ideological or theological elements. 
The decision would in part rest on the process in intelligence prediction and forecasting to 
ascertain the various indications and warning indicators that could focus upon determining where 
the constituent components of the Deadly Trinity were intersecting. 
Neither option would be an easy task. The legality of the former option would require international 
consensus maybe including a United Nations resolution and would require protracted diplomacy. 
The cases of Iraq, Iran and North Korea highlight this dilemma. The later option would be as 
daunting as looking for a needle in a haystack. Planning and preparation, under and through the 
auspices of the Civil Emergency Secretariat of the UK Cabinet office, has tended towards 
prevention as being better than a cure, towards containment during and after a toxic attack and 
towards civil defense and emergency planning.[21] Part of this planning also reflects the evolving 
nature of criminal and police interactions. For example, less than twenty years ago the majority of 
police in Great Britain did not bear arms. A simple yard long baton made of wood and handcuffs 
were the mainstay of their compliment in handling all forms of crime. Less than 1% of all police, 
only in small elite units, were armed. By 2001 this had risen to around 20% of all police following 
a rise in fire-arm related and knife related crimes.[22] 
The escalation in localized criminal activities using hand firearms has led authorities to analyze 
global trends in terrorism, warlordism and organized crime. An escalation is understood to have 
happened especially with organized cartels of narco-producers and traffickers who have even 
acquired hand-held surface-to-air missiles to defend their crop areas and headquarters for 
example in Columbia. Consequently there is cause for concern that localized criminal activities 
could escalate to the use of more sophisticated weaponry including sub-machine guns, rocket 
propelled grenades, or even toxic substances. This could be to defend or extend their areas of 
trade without any ideological or theological indicators. Given this it has been concluded that it is 
not necessary for ideological or religious elements to be present in a WMD proliferation network 
involving the marriage of convenience between warlords and organized crime. 
There is also no specific point that can be identified at which terrorism, warlordism or organized 
crime could or would implement a WMD proliferation network with ideological or theological 
elements. The circumstances could be coincidental simply by the toxic substances being 
available, by being offered at the right price and the right time where an egotistic or mad terrorist, 
warlord or criminal takes to the notion, or through an adversaries perceived or actual acquisition 
of similar toxic substances. Escalation from one form of weaponry to another can occur with any 
due thought process to the consequences. In particular the mere distribution of a recipe for the 
manufacture of toxic substances could generate a global WMD proliferation network with or 
without ideological or religious elements. Such an escalation by terrorists, warlords or criminals is 
no different from the manner from which escalation takes place in the acquisition of weapons by 
nation states.  
The Limitations of Domestic Law 
The evidence from the London Ricin Cell thus substantiated the theoretical underpinnings of 
causes for concern on linkages between organized crime, warlordism and terrorism. The arrests 
and trials of individuals in the London Ricin cell saga also highlighted the dilemma in handling 
suspected terrorists and WMD proliferation networks through domestic law and during peacetime 
in democratic states such as the United Kingdom. The judicial system of England and Wales, like 
in other democracies, serves three purposes. This is firstly to deter would-be offenders through 
the ability to impose prison terms and fines. However and for example, the suicide bombers in the 
7 July 2005 terrorists attack on the London Transport System were not deterred and died in the 
suicide attacks. No legal system is capable of deterring such suicide terrorists not even when it 
descends to promoting deterrence through imposing collective punishment through retribution to 
the perpetrators family and community. 
Secondly and thirdly the legal system acts through punitive action once a criminal offense has 
been committed and/or to offer compensation to victims. However these options would be too 
little to late if the criminal action were to be the usage of toxic weapons as a tool of murder, no 
matter the whether the motive was criminal, ideological, theological or insanity. Specifically the 
London Ricin Cell arrests highlight the dilemma of the length of prison sentences and the nature 
of defining the crimes committed prior to the use of toxic substances. There is no law, as yet, that 
makes a crime the possession of raw materials that could be used to make most biological or 
chemical weapons. For example, there is no legislation that forbids the possession of castor 
beans that is the raw material for ricin. 
Hence the dilemma of the courts of law in the case of the London Ricin Cell network trial turned to 
debate and define: 1) What is a weapon? and 2) Can it inflict mass destruction—for example 
during both World Wars, conventional weapons inflicted mass destruction. In the deliberations in 
the trial of Kamel Bourgass specific issues raised included: 
• What is ricin? Ricin is a toxic material that can be fatal when inhaled, ingested or—most 
dangerously—injected. It is easily produced, and can be extracted from the beans of the 
castor oil plant. It can damage the organs, and a combination of pulmonary, liver, renal 
and immunological failure can lead to death, although people can recover from exposure. 
Ricin, is explicitly prohibited as a toxin weapon by the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC), and is also listed in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC).  
• How does it get into the body? It can be delivered through the air in an aerosol spray, or it 
can be injected or swallowed. One to three castor beans chewed by a child, or just eight 
seeds chewed by an adult can be fatal.  
• How potent is it? Just a tiny amount of ricin is enough to kill. Seventy micrograms or two 
millionths of an ounce is enough to kill an adult, roughly the equivalent to the weight of a 
single grain of salt. Per gram, it is 6,000 times more poisonous than cyanide.  
The court thus conceded that ricin was a poison however it was not possible to cause huge 
numbers of casualties. The mere possession of “castor beans” could not be considered as 
possession of a weapon and could not form the basis for prosecution for terrorism, murder or the 
sentencing of life imprisonment. In the case of the London Ricin Cell no evidence was uncovered 
that ricin would be used to kill anyone. The terms “mass” and “destruction” were also 
inappropriate. In summary the court found that the actual ability and capability to inflict ricin as a 
weapon of mass destruction was not evident and that there was no clear evidence of intent to 
perpetrate an act of terrorism using ricin as a weapon. Nevertheless the court and subsequent 
media analysis accepted that those who would be prepared to produce ricin, could be prepared to 
use other more deadly and more widely dispersible chemical and biological means to attack a 
civil population if such capability was available.[23] There was clear understating that politically, 
though not militarily, Ricin and indeed all other chemical and bio-weapons can be considered as 
the “poor mans nuclear weapon.” 
The courts hearing the case of the London Ricin Cell then turned to considering whether or not a 
WMD proliferation network existed among the accused. As there was no previous instances of 
such a case of a WMD proliferation network the definition of a network remained ambiguous. To 
assist the court turned to the definition of an organized crime group and in doing so unwittingly 
created the legal precedence to link terrorism with organized crime. The National Criminal 
Intelligence Service, now part of the Serious Organised Crime Agency defines an organized 
crime group as satisfying all the following four criteria: 1) contains at least three people; 2) 
criminal activity is prolonged or indefinite; 3) criminals are motivated by profit or power; 4) serious 
criminal offenses are being committed. To sustain that the London Ricin Cell was a WMD 
proliferation network following this legal debate it was shown that:  
• In a chapter on assassinations from an undated al-Qa`ida military manual, 'I'alan al-Jihad 
'ala al-Tawaghit al-Bilad [Declaration of Jihad Against the Country's Tyrants], a copy of 
which was seized in 2002 by the Manchester police, a number of recipes for making 
poisons were provided, including a method for manufacturing ricin.  
• This manual instructs the reader to “soak...castor-oil plant seeds in about 10 ounces of 
water, adding two teaspoons of [lye].”[24] The recipe described in this particular al-Qa`ida 
manual appears to have been translated nearly word-for-word from The Poisoner's 
Handbook (1988), an underground pamphlet widely distributed.[25]  
• In March 2002 trace amounts of both bacillus anthracis (anthrax) spores and ricin were 
found at a few of the approximately 110 sites searched by coalition forces in Afghanistan, 
using this recipe.[26]  
• On 10 July 2002, a suspected BW smuggler was detained in the Afghan village of 
Hesarak; materials in his possession revealed trace amounts of ricin having been 
manufactured using this recipe.[27]  
• In August 2002, the Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam), which 
has apparent ties to both al-Qa`ida and Iran,[28] tested ricin manufactured using this 
recipe, on barnyard animals.[29]  
• A French Islamist cell was arrested in December 2002 by the Direction de la Surveillance 
du Territoire (DST: Directorate for Territorial Security, the French domestic intelligence 
agency) who had training with Chechens in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge area who were 
known to have manufactured ricin using this recipe.[30]  
• On 13 January 2003, Russian special forces units operating in Chechnya found this 
recipe for making poisons, including ricin, in the possession of a guerrilla fighter they had 
killed.[31]  
• The same recipe was found in the Wood Green apartment during the raid in January 
2003 while it was shown that the accused had contacts and had visited some of the 
afore-mentioned locations and individuals.  
It was therefore concluded that a WMD proliferation network existed in the case of the London 
Ricin Cell to acquire toxic substances by individuals with similar ideological and/or theological 
purposes. However the size of the network, the nature of its leadership and its ultimate intent 
remained undefined. As no serious criminal offense had taken place it was therefore not possible 
to prosecute for a WMD proliferation network even based upon the definition of an organized 
crime network. Important, however, was the process of the debate that intricately linked 
definitions of organized crime with that of terrorism in WMD proliferation networks. 
It was therefore only possible to convict one out of the seven arrestees for poison conspiracy 
based on his admission.[32] This was Kamel Bourgass, 31, an Algerian who had lived in the 
apartment raided on 5 January 2003 in the London suburb of Wood Green. He could not be jailed 
for the possession of a weapon of mass destruction nor for terrorism given that only castor beans 
and a recipe had been found yet no weaponised ricin.[33] His sentence was materially not 
relevant since he had already been sentenced for murdering a British police constable. 
Conclusions 
This chapter commenced by noting that terrorism, warlordism and organized crime could exhibit 
many similar characteristics. It concludes noting that there is cause for concern as there are 
instances where they form an ad hoc Deadly Trinity and that this could tend towards global WMD 
proliferation networks. Such a cause for concern emanates from experience in dealing with weak 
and failed states where warlords and terrorist organizations co-exist in close geographical 
proximity. Increasingly warlords and terrorists have connections to organized crime such as 
narcotic production and trafficking and money laundering. The tribal/clan structure of warlordism 
could embrace militant or radical ideological or religious elements due to terrorist influence. 
Warlords and terrorists could use mutually beneficial networks through organized crime such as 
narco-trafficking and human traffickers. Such organized crime traffickers could then become 
associated with other extremist or radical ideological or religious groups or movements in other 
countries. In this a global WMD proliferation network could originate in a weak/failed state and 
continue in a strong Western democracy. 
This chapter, in its introduction posed five questions that have been answered showing that when 
considered together substantiate that WMD proliferation networks exist and that the London Ricin 
cell was one such network. In doing so further cause for concern was posed in the ability to tackle 
any such linkages in terrorism, warlordism and organized crime. Clearly current domestic 
legislation in western democracies is severely limited in handling intent to undertake an act of 
terror, in handling suicide terrorism, and even further limited in deliberating how to handle a WMD 
proliferation network. Current legislation is severely limited in handling those who possess the 
means to undertake a chemical or biological attack where intent is not shown to exist. This is 
evident in the case of the London Ricin Cell where no actual weapon was found nor was there 
any evidence of a specific target. This is despite the discovery of the raw materials such as castor 
beans, whose seeds contain ricin; bottles of acetone, which can be used in producing the poison; 
and handwritten notes in Arabic with a formula for ricin. Legislation is also limited in determining 
the types of substance that could constituent the capability to inflict mass destruction should the 
substance not yet be in weapon form. 
Given the above findings it appears that the last resort in countering a WMD proliferation network 
such as existed with the London Ricin Cell is the responsibility of local police working with local 
communities to apprehend any rogue individual. In a the larger picture the best means of 
preventing a WMD proliferation network from emerging through the coalescence of terrorism, 
warlordism and organized crime is to tackle the issue of weak (fragile) and failed states. This will 
satisfy the horizontal and vertical gaps and enforcement in increasing the number of states that 
will participate and concur in the compliance of arms control measures, treaties and regimes. The 
evolutionary nature of proliferation and counter-proliferation may necessitate preemptive military 
action against a rogue state or rogue non-state actors. Combined these efforts will result not only 
in tackling WMD proliferation networks but also in handling warlordism, narco-trafficking, human 
trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime and in promoting stability and democracy. 
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